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SURVEY OF ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
Ronald Umali Mendoza*
Ateneo de Manila University
Charles Siriban
University of Melbourne Faculty of Business and Economics
Tea Jalin Ty
Ateneo de Manila University
Abstract. Drawing on studies on the economics of conflict, this paper reviews the literature on
maritime and territorial disputes; and it examines an array of economic implications associated with
territorial and maritime disputes. These include adverse effects on certain economic and development
outcomes arising from possible armed confrontation, with some of these possibly lingering in the
aftermath of conflict. There are also various economic disruptions and costs associated with these
disputes, emphasizing how they also affect the livelihoods of resource users in the disputed areas.
A clearer understanding of these economic links could help inform and motivate policymakers on
mitigating the risks of conflict. Based on the review of evidence herein, the economic implications of
conflict in terms of foregone average trade among the country pairs considered in the West Philippine
Sea/South China Sea (in 1985 dollars) – which differ in important ways but hint at some common
channels of impact – could range from US$ 909.3 million to US$ 98.8 billion. More broadly, the
impacts on a disrupted global production chain can easily amplify these results even further, affecting
global growth prospects for many decades, according to experience.
Keywords. Maritime and territorial disputes; South China Sea

1. Introduction
Maritime and territorial disputes represent important challenges in international relations. Many of these
disputes continue to be a main source of tensions among concerned countries, in some cases leading to
both nonmilitary and military confrontations. By one estimate, around one-third of territorial disputes
over the past two centuries have evolved into armed confrontations (Hensel, 1999 as cited in Wiegand,
2011:2). In some instances, such conflicts have lasted only for a couple of days while some have lasted
for years.
With its continued presence in the international sphere, these disputes and its resulting confrontations
could produce lasting economic implications. In fact, currently, some of the territorial and maritime
disputes are located in vital areas of the economic arena.
∗ Corresponding

author contact email: ronmendoza@post.harvard.edu. Tel: +63 02 4265997 loc. 4643.

Journal of Economic Surveys (2019) Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 1028–1049

C 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF DISPUTES

1029

For instance, in the Asia-Pacific region, a number of countries have overlapping claims in the West
Philippine Sea/South China Sea and East China Sea. According to one unofficial estimate, the maritime
economy in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea – spanning petroleum, natural gas, fishing, and
other resources – could reach well over US$1 trillion (Mendoza, 2012). Furthermore, the stakes are
high given the possible risks associated with such disputes on the international production networks and
supply chains that are present in the said areas. Asian countries have seen an increased participation in
such production chains in the recent years, with some countries serving as production hubs of parts and
components and others serving as assembly hubs of final products (APEC Policy Support Unit, 2013;
Cheewatrakoolpong et al., 2013).
The West Philippine Sea/South China Sea also serves as a vital passageway of commercial ships, with
around US$ 5.3 trillion worth of trade passing through the said area every year (Glaser, 2012). If even a
fraction of this is disrupted or destroyed, the economic implications of conflict could escalate and impose
severe costs on global growth and national development prospects, even for those countries not directly
involved but still affected.
Clearly, territorial and maritime disputes could entail adverse effects on certain economic and
development outcomes arising from possible confrontation, with some of these possibly lingering in
the aftermath of conflict.
As a contribution to the discussions on disputes and as part of the continued effort to pave the
way towards their meaningful and fair resolution, this paper conducts a review of literature in this area to
examine the array of economic implications to the involved states. The paper aims to outline how economic
implications arise from disputes of territorial and maritime nature. We further sift these implications in
relation to violent and nonviolent disputes. Lastly, the paper estimates the implications on international
trade among belligerent countries in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea maritime and territorial
disputes in the event of a hypothetical armed conflict.

2. Territorial and Maritime Disputes
Following the definition of Hensel (1997), disputes are explicit contentions between competing claims
of two or more nation states. There must be explicit statements of the claim from official government
representatives. When the claim is for sovereignty over a specific territory, the dispute classifies as
territorial. When the claim is for the use of a specific maritime zone, the dispute classifies as maritime.
Maritime disputes emerged in prominence only after the ratification of the UN Convention of the Laws
of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the 1900s. In clarifying maritime boundaries, the UNCLOS created overlapping
zones two and sometimes more nation states have claim to (Fravel, 2014).
Disputes can manifest in four different stages: peaceful resolutions, ongoing disputes without armed
conflict, armed conflict, and interstate war (Choi, 2009). The latter two stages are military conflicts,
defined in international law as two or more states resorting to armed force (International Committee of
the Red Cross [ICRC], 2008).
Various studies find evidence linking interstate military conflicts and territorial disputes. Results of
the analysis conducted by Kocs (1995:170–172) using data on territorial disputes over the period 1945
to 1987 show greater frequency of war among countries with contested boundaries as opposed to those
whose boundaries are clearly defined and legally valid. In addition, Hensel (1996:59) finds that militarized
interstate disputes are almost thrice as likely to escalate into full-blown wars among country pairs with
territorial dispute relative to those that are not involved in any dispute of similar type.
As noted by Hensel (2000:58–60), one explanation on the observed link between armed conflict and
territorial dispute hinges on the array of values that a contested territory contains from the point of
view of concerned countries. First among these are the tangible benefits, which include among others its
resource and commerce-related endowments (for instance, if the territory has access to vital commercial
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routes). There also exist nontangible benefits, such as its perceived historical connection to the claimant
countries. The contested territory serves as a vital component of the claimant countries’ identity and as
such, territorial disputes evoke a sense of pride and nationalism among their citizens (Fearon, 1995:390
as cited in Hensel, 2000:59; Luard, 1970:7 and Vasquez, 1993 as cited in Hensel, 2000:60), making
compromise agreement more difficult to achieve relative to the case where the dispute merely concerns
resource-sharing issues (Fearon, 1995 as cited in Hensel, 2000:59). There are also reputation issues, in
which case a claimant country would opt not to give up its claim due to fear of providing other countries
greater leverage (Hensel, 2000:60).
Territorial disputes have indeed evolved into running skirmishes and military disputes. While other
factors have also contributed to the decision of concerned countries to resort to military conflict, analysts
have considered territorial dispute to be an influential factor. For instance, as posited by West (2006:77),
the Vietnamese government’s claim of historical rights over Spratly islands in the aftermath of the
Vietnamese war, along with geopolitical considerations, has contributed in part to the emergence of the
Sino-Vietnamese war. Such was also the case of the dispute between Peru and Ecuador with regards to
the demarcation of their 883-mile long border. The territorial dispute commenced shortly after Ecuador
declared independence from Great Colombia in 1830 and persisted for years until an agreement was
signed in 1998 by the Presidents of both countries. Before 1998, however, there were at least 34 instances
of military conflict arising from the said dispute, including a military confrontation in 1995 (Simmons,
1999:10–19).
In contrast to territorial disputes, disputes in the maritime arena have seen less military escalation.
Kaplan (2014) invokes political scientist Mearsheimer’s “stopping power of water,” wherein despite
naval forces and technology, bodies of water still prevents armies and even airstrikes to reach hostile
shores quickly to subdue a hostile population. Kaplan (2014) traces the historical East Asian military
confrontations that are exceptions to this, but maintains that the geographic influence of the seas held
true for Taiwan, and Japanese Ryuku Islands, whose mainland shores remain safe from full scale Chinese
military aggression.
Because of the geographic difficulties posed by the seas, maritime disputes that escalate into violent
confrontations unfurl far away from civilian settlements and will involve only calculated military and
naval power and personnel. This is in contrast to onshore military encounters, where civilian life and
property are inevitably caught in the crossfires. Kaplan (2014) posits that military confrontations that are
maritime in nature will be separated from human rights issues. This entails that these confrontations will
be demarcated from the economic cost of casualties, and destruction of private property.
The next sections discuss economic implications of disputes to claimant countries involved in both
violent and nonviolent maritime and territorial disputes. The discussion draws from extensive literature
on various disputes around the world from 1979 onwards (see Table 1) The disputes are not intended
to represent all disputes, but rather intended to present what has been studied with regards to economic
implications.
The passage of UNCLOS gave attention to offshore islands in disputed zones, as islands can be basis
to expand a maritime claim (Fravel, 2014). Thus, many of the emerging maritime disputes are interlinked
to territorial disputes, in the form of these islands. With regards to the dispute between Iran and Iraq, the
Shatt Al Arab waterway is not a maritime zone but rather a body of water that overlaps territorial borders.
Furthermore, as disputes develop, nation states could choose to engage in both violent and nonviolent
confrontations, subsequently or simultaneously. For example, aside from military confrontations, the
United Kingdom froze Argentinian assets in Britain, suspended new export credits, halted military sales,
and banned imports of Argentinian goods during their dispute with Argentina over the Falklands (Daoudi
and Dajani, 1983). However, we classify them as violent due to their eventual escalation to violent,
military conflicts.
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Table 1. Discussed Disputes Category and Nature of Confrontations.

Maritime
Violent

Nonviolent

Nicaragua–Honduras/Columbia

Territorial
UK–Argentina
China–Vietnam
Iraq–Kuwait
Ecuador–Peru
Ethiopia–Eritrea
Argentina–Chile

Both
Iran–Iraq

West Philippine Sea/South
China Sea
Japan–China
Iran–UAE

Source: Compiled by the authors.

3. Economic Implications of Nonviolent and Nonmilitary Confrontations of Disputes
States in disputes can choose to assert their claims through nonviolent, nonmilitary actions. Examples
of these actions in include contracting economic and diplomatic relations, propaganda and rhetoric
against the opposing state, and even attempts to destabilize the opposing claimant’s government. In an
analysis of territorial disputes between 1950 and 1990, Huth (1996) found that aggressive diplomacy and
politics by the claimant states account for 32% of annual observations, as opposed to no or low levels of
confrontations, and military confrontation. These nonviolent, nonmilitary confrontations entail economic
consequences as well.

3.1 Uncertainty and Trade Sanctions
Disputes are often associated with two types of uncertainty which can affect economic activities. On
the one hand, jurisdictional uncertainty exists in which case there is ambiguity on whose rules and legal
protections will apply on a certain jurisdiction. This in turn induces higher risk on the part of firms when
conducting cross-border transactions. Such was the case in the Persian Gulf area in which shipping and
fishing are occasionally disrupted due to the existence of dispute between Iran and United Arab Emirates
over Abu Musa Islands (see Box 1 for further details).
On the other hand, disputes are also associated with policy uncertainty to the extent that countries that
are parties to disputes tweak their policies in response to the dispute. Such was the case of Nicaragua,
which imposed a 35% tariff on all goods from Honduras and Colombia in response to their maritime
delimitation agreement, which Nicaragua criticized as including an area it considers as part of its territory
(Simmons, 2005:828–829).
China has allegedly engaged in economic pressures to further its interest in various maritime and
territorial disputes. In 2012, Japan nationalized three Senakaku/Diaoyu islands, which were claimed by
China and previously owned by a private Japanese citizen. The nationalization incited a Chinese consumerled boycott of Japanese goods, especially Japanese branded cars. The boycott coincided with a drop in
Japanese exports to China, as traced by Zachrisen (2015). Nagy (2013), supports this in demonstrating
that sales volume of Japanese-made cars in China dropped 2% year-on-year, while sales of cars produced
by Germany, United States, South Korea, and France went up.
In the same year, a standoff between China and the Philippines over Chinese fishermen in the disputed
Scarborough Shoal waters was preceded by the holding of Philippine banana imports in Chinese ports.
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Although the Chinese government claims that the imports were held for quality regulation reasons,
many speculate it is meant as sanctions and retaliation. Zachrisen (2015) finds a sharp drop in Philippine
banana imports compared to the previous year’s data, based on Chinese government data. Curiously, in
the same period, there was a huge increase in Ecuador banana exports to China, suggesting trade was
diverted to Ecuador.
Note in regard to Chinese sanctions, that scholars such as Poh (2017) argue that these Chinese
“sanctions” are unfounded media speculation. This author points to Philippine government annual data
on Mindanao exports of banana related products to China, which shows that exports actually increased
in 2012. She further argues that bananas are a negligible portion of the overall China-Philippine trade,
and thus would not be the most powerful and effective sanction for China to wield if it chose to do
so. Separately, Zachrisen (2015) also investigates that media-reported Chinese embargo on rare earth
elements (REE) imports to Japan in response to a skirmish over the disputed Senkaku/Diayou islands.
Zachrisen found that data from UN Comtrade shows that with the exception of scandium and yttrium,
there is no impact on volume of REE trade between the countries in late 2010.

3.2 Bilateral Trade
Using data from 1950 to 1995 for 557 contiguous country pairs, Simmons (2005:835) finds that the
presence of a territorial dispute between country pairs is associated with a 28% decline in the value of
their bilateral trade in the short run. Furthermore, Simmons (2005:835) finds that a territorial dispute
has a long-run effect on bilateral trade of contiguous countries. In particular, territorial dispute is
associated with a reduction in the average value of annual bilateral trade, from the sample mean of
US$ 3.17 million to around US$ 2.3 million in the short run, and to around US$ 1.17 million in the
long run.
These suggest a significant amount of foregone trade when applied to some cases of countries
with territorial disputes. For instance, Simmons estimates that the previous territorial dispute between
Argentina and Chile (which lasted from 1950 to 1995) is associated with cumulative foregone trade
amounting to almost US$ 33 billion over the same period. The said figure is close to the estimated total
military spending by Argentina over the period 1962 to 1994 (at US$ 37 billion) and is higher than the
counterpart figure for Chile (at US$ 22 billion). While the estimated cumulative losses in bilateral trade
are smaller for other countries, the estimated amounts can still be considered as significant. (Simmons,
2005:836–838).
Similarly, results of the analysis by Brutger and Wright (2014) applied over a sample of 490 pairs of
countries1 from 1950 to 1990 show that the marginal effect of the presence of a bilateral dispute amounts
to a loss of more than half (around 55%) of value of annual trade between countries in a dyad. Interestingly,
the same study finds that for a given country pair, the presence of both territorial and militarized disputes
is associated with a 2.5% increase in the annual value of third-party trade. The authors posit that the said
result suggests a possible trade diversion toward third-party countries, but only when there is a sufficiently
high level of dispute escalation.2

3.3 Natural Resources
Many areas that are subject to territorial dispute contain various resource endowments (such as diverse
fisheries and other marine resources) and as such, the uncertainties associated with a territorial dispute
also affect those who depend primarily on the said endowments for their livelihood. Box 1 contains cases
of territorial disputes and how these affect those who traditionally fish in the disputed areas. In most
cases, fishermen tend to be caught in between countries that are party to the dispute. There are reports
of harassment experienced by such fishermen, ranging from confiscation of some of their tools to use of
force (such as ships and air forces) to drive them away from the disputed area.
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Box 1. How fishermen in disputed areas are affected by territorial disputes: Selected cases.
Colombia and Nicaragua
After a case was brought to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by Nicaragua in 2011, the court’s decision in
2012 has paved the way for the transfer of a sea area of about 30,000 square miles from Colombia to Nicaragua.
The said area has been considered as a rich fishing ground and potentially has significant amount of oil. Reports
indicate the presence of Colombian Navy warships in the area in the aftermath of the Court’s decision, and that
warships, as well as helicopters and planes, were reportedly used to harass Nicaraguan fishermen. This in turn
induced the Nicaraguan government to send coast guard ships in the area (The Economist, 2012).
The Colombian government announced that it would continue its navy and aerial patrols in the area, with a
navy commander reportedly given instruction to “maintain the sovereignty of Colombia’s maritime jurisdiction as
it has been historically known” (Castro, 2012). Results of a survey conducted in Colombia the aftermath of the
ICJ decision show that around 85% of respondents believe that their government should not accept the ruling
despite the possible implications of such move with regards to its relations with Nicaragua (The Economist, 2012;
Paterson and Flyn, 2013:6).
United Arab Emirates and Iran
Territorial disputes between the United Arab Emirates and Iran concern Abu Musa, and Greater and Lesser Tunbs
Islands. Abu Musa is approximately thirty-four miles away from UAE and forty-three miles away from Iran. A
previous agreement stipulated co-management by Iran and UAE of Abu Musa islands. However, Iran has taken
steps to have a monopoly of control over the said island, constructing an airstrip and increasing its military
presence in the said island (Seddiq, 2001).
The Greater and Lesser Tunbs islands, on the other hand, are located in an area that is considered as
passageway for international ships. The dispute between the two countries has caused intermittent disruption of
shipping and fishing activities in the disputed area. In 2013, for instance, the Iranian authorities arrested 12 UAE
and 1 Indian fishermen for alleged trespassing. The fishermen were freed days later, after reportedly signing a
document stating that they will never trespass the territorial waters of Abu Musa Island (Shaaban, 2013).
Vietnam, Philippines and China.
Vietnam, Philippines and China are among the countries with overlapping claims in the West Philippine
Sea/South China Sea area. In the recent years, reports surface of Chinese fishing vessels expanding their
operations into areas that serve as traditional fishing grounds for Vietnamese fishermen. Reports indicate various
instances during which Chinese vessels would arrive as a group (sometimes accompanied by Chinese authorities),
making it difficult for Vietnamese authorities to disperse such ships from traditional Vietnamese fishing grounds
(see for instance Huy, 2011 as cited in Tuan, 2012–2013:100).
Some reports also suggest harassment among Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese soldiers, with one report
suggesting that some Vietnamese fishermen were denied entry in Paracel islands during a period of severe weather
in late 2007. The Chinese soldiers eventually allowed such fishermen to enter the islands. However, the fishermen
were reportedly detained and were asked to sign a document certifying that they have entered Chinese waters in
the aftermath of the storm. Properties of some Vietnamese fishermen were also reportedly confiscated by Chinese
authorities, such as fuel supplies owned by Vietnamese fishermen, leaving only sufficient amount of fuel for the
fishermen to be able to return to Vietnam (Tuan, 2012–2013:101–102).
Similarly, the standoff between the Philippines and China in Scarborough shoal (which was a traditional
fishing ground of fishermen in nearby Zambales province) in 2012 has narrowed the areas where people can
safely conduct their fishing activities. Reports of harassment surfaced, with some Filipino fishermen reportedly
driven out of the periphery of the shoal by Chinese authorities through water cannon. Reports also suggest that
Filipino fishermen are denied entry to Scarborough shoal even in the presence of typhoon or any severe weather.
As a result of the dispute, some fishermen were reported to have shifted to other livelihood activities (such as hog
raising) (Associated Press, 2013; Cupin, 2015).
Source: Compiled from various sources.
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Such moves, as well as the reluctance of one party to accept entry of fishermen from other claimant
countries in its occupied portion of the disputed areas, narrow the area where fishermen can pursue
their fishing activities with minimal uncertainty, in turn affecting their earnings and livelihood. In many
developing countries, a significant number of fishermen belong to low-income households3 and that
fishing activities serve as one of the main sources of their earnings. While it is possible for such fishermen
to shift to other occupation in the long run, the dependence of many of them to fisheries suggests their
vulnerability to the short run disruptive effects of a territorial dispute.
Furthermore, the fishing industry supports a range of other industries, including fish processing,
production of tin cans and shipbuilding, among others. The contribution of such broader economic
activities can be considered as significant, with one estimate showing that the value of output supported
by such industries amount to around US$ 240 billion per year, three times larger than the estimated
landing value of marine fisheries (Dyck and Sumaila, 2010:235). A territorial dispute can affect not only
the direct fisheries output of a country that is party to the dispute but also the output of other sectors
supported by the fishing industry. Also, some disputed areas serve not only as traditional fishing grounds
but are intertwined as well with other fishing grounds in the area. The South China Sea/West Philippine
Sea, for instance, is estimated to house 100,000 km2 of coral reefs, or around 34% of the world total
(Burke et al., 2002:8). As such, territorial disputes have implications not only on the management of the
resources in the disputed areas but also of resources on other fishing grounds that are biologically related
to them.

4. Economic Implications of Violent and Military Confrontations of Disputes
Violent and military confrontations include military conflict where nation states resort to armed force
(ICRC, 2008). Jones et al. (1996) defines these as threats, displays, or use of military force by a nation
state against another state. These confrontations include confrontations of differing intensity, from threats
to actual combat.
While there are differences with regards to the intensity and duration of military confrontations, all are
associated with significant costs on human life and on society. As posited by Stewart (1993, as cited in
Harris, 1999:15–16), the economic costs of war can be classified as follows:

r Human costs which refer to the immediate costs borne by the society due to war. Included here are
costs associated with reduced production of goods and services, reduced government expenditure
on health and education due to diversion of fiscal resources for war time needs, and direct and
indirect effects of war felt by households and individuals (such as casualties and injuries, foregone
economic opportunities and foregone access to health and education services).
r Development costs which refer to costs associated with the depletion of an economy’s capital stock
and foregone investment due to war. Capital includes physical infrastructure as well as human and
social capital. Examples of development costs include costs associated with the decrease in the
proportion of educated workers in the labor force and the loss of trust and respect for law and private
property due to war, among others.
The main channels through which these costs materialize are further elaborated below.

4.1 Casualties
One issue of interest concerns the valuation of economic costs associated with the loss of life during times
of military conflict that arise from territorial disputes (see Table 2). While no metric can fully encapsulate
the toll associated with the loss of life and injuries during war, such valuation can provide a benchmark
estimate of the extent of human casualties caused by war.
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Table 2. Selected Post-World War II Skirmishes Associated with Territorial Disputes.
Date of encounter

Countries included

April 2 to June 14,
1982

United Kingdom
and Argentina

February 16 to
March 17, 1979

1980 to 1988

August 2, 1990 to
February 28,
1991

January 26, 1995
to February 28,
1995
May 1998 to June
2000

Disputed territory
Falkland Islands

Casualties and associated costs

r Military casualties: death of around 800 to

1000 Argentine soldiers and 250 British
soldiers
r Estimated cost to the British government
of around US$ 1.19 billion
r Estimated cost of around US$ 5 billion to
the Argentine government
r Death of around 25,000 to 28,000 Chinese
People’s Republic
Overlapping claims
soldiers and injury of around 37,000
of China and
over certain islands in
soldiers
Vietnam
the Spratlys area, and
r Death of around 20,000 Vietnamese
land near the border
soldiers and injury of around 35,000 to
territory
45,000 soldiers
Iran and Iraq
Shatt Al Arab waterway r Estimated death toll of around 1,000,000 in
Iran and 250,000 to 500,000 in Iraq
r Estimated economic cost amounting to
US$ 644 billion in Iran and US$ 453
billion in Iraq
r Death of around 50,000 to 120,000 Iraqi
Iraq and Kuwait
Kuwait
soldiers
r Death of around 5,000 to 15,000 Iraqi
civilians during the war
r Death of around 20,000 to 100,000 Iraqi
civilians during the uprisings conducted in
the aftermath of the war
r Death of around 15,000 to 30,000
displaced Iraqi civilians
r Death of around 4000 to 16,000 Iraqi
civilians due to starvation and disease
r Estimated replacement cost of destroyed
Iraqi assets: US$ 200 billion
r Estimated cost of war in Kuwait: US$ 65
billion
r Reduction in Kuwait’s GDP and increase
in government debt
r Around 200 to 1500 casualties
Ecuador and Peru
Dispute over 883-mile
r Estimated total cost of up to US$ 1 billion
long border (which
includes Condor
Mountain range)
r Estimated total military fatalities of around
Ethiopia and Eritrea Border areas (Badme,
Tsorona-Zalambessa
70,000 to 100,000
r Internal displacement of around 360,000
and Bure regions in
people in Ethiopia as of May 2000
Ethiopia)
r Internal displacement of around 1.1
million people in Eritrea during the war

Source: Compiled by the authors from various sources.
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Casualties due to military conflicts may also continue to pile up even after the war, as in the case of the
First Gulf War. These include the postconflict death of many Iraqi civilians due to lack of purified water
systems, lack of well-functioning health care delivery systems and destruction of vital infrastructures
(such as power generating plants), among others (Alnasrawi, 1992:345–346).

4.2 Economic Growth and Standard of Living
Armed conflict can also affect economic growth and the standard of living in different ways. Casualties and
destruction of properties and productive capacities of a country, in turn adversely affecting its economy
in the short run (see for instance Yamarik, Johnson and Compton, 2010). By one estimate, the Iran–Iraq
war, which is partly rooted in the territorial dispute over the Shatt Al Arab waterway, cost Iran around
US$ 644 billion, with war damage and lost potential production (excluding oil) comprising a large part
(at around US$ 450 billion) of the estimated cost. Iraq, on the other hand, is estimated to have incurred
economic cost amounting to US$ 453 billion which includes oil revenue losses amounting to US$ 198
billion. Such estimated losses amount to around 60% of Iran’s Gross National Product (GNP) and 112%
of Iraq’s GNP over 8 years of war (Mofid, 1990 as cited in Harris, 1999:18–19).
Military conflicts are also associated with build-up of military capabilities, which affects the economy
through various channels. First among these are the demand effects which include multiplier effects
associated with increased military spending and crowding out of other expenditures. The crowding out
effect would depend on how the additional military spending is financed. If for instance, the increase in
spending is financed through additional government borrowing, this may lead to increase in real interest
rates which can then crowd out private investment. On the other hand, additional military spending can
result in changes in output of other industrial sectors as some resources are reallocated toward the defense
industry (Dunne et al., 2005:450–451).
To the extent that increased security leads to increased economic activity, and increased military
spending leads to increased security, greater military spending can, in some cases, produce positive
consequences for a country’s economy. However, greater military spending in one country can possibly
lead to an arms race with other countries, which can then adversely affect the security situation of those
countries (Dunne et al., 2005:451).
Yamarik et al. (2010:16) find that a one standard deviation increase in the value of a country’s conflict
indicator4 results in a reduction of about 14% of standard deviation of its 2000 real GDP per capita.
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010:16–24), on the other hand, find evidence indicating the presence of
short run effects associated with interstate military conflict. Results show that a one unit increase in the
number of war dead per thousand population leads to 2.20 percentage point and 2.25 percentage point
lower average economic growth rate using observations that utilize 2-year and 1-year time intervals,5
respectively. Similar results are also observed for regression runs using observations from low-income
countries as well as African countries, suggesting a significant toll on developing countries associated
with such conflicts.
However, other studies yield results showing an insignificant or even positive relationship between
interstate war and output variables. For instance, results of the analysis by Koubi (2005:78) show that
greater war duration from 1960 to 1974 is associated with higher average annual economic growth over
the period 1975 to 1989 using a sample of 114 countries. As such, this potentially suggests the presence
of a “phoenix factor” in certain cases, a term coined by Organski and Kugler (1977) upon observing
that countries on the losing side have recovered rapidly within 15 to 20 years after the two world
wars.
Various explanations have been put forward to explain the said observation. Consistent with the
predictions of the neoclassical growth theory, it is possible for countries to experience convergence in
the long run (Koubi, 2005:79). Also, it is possible that interstate military conflict has undermined if not
eliminated the vested interests opposed to economic reforms in belligerent countries (Olson, 1982). Aside
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from possible multiplier effects, increased military activity can potentially induce an increase in research
and innovation activities, in turn affecting an economy’s long-run trajectory (Ruttan, 2006).

4.3 Trade and Investment
Military confrontations can also affect trade through different channels. On the one hand, military
encounters can disrupt commerce, thereby reducing the volume of trade among the concerned countries.
Alternatively, there are also security externalities associated with trade, including export of strategic goods
which can strengthen the military capabilities of an adversary country as well as income gains that can
be attained by an adversary country as a result of trade. To the extent that governments are aware of the
presence of such externalities, policies can be initiated to push firms to internalize them, thereby reducing
trade among warring countries (Kastner, 2007:667–668).
As shown in Table 4, there are studies which find that a military conflict has negative impact on bilateral
trade (Pollins, 1989; Anderton and Carter, 2001; Glick and Taylor, 2005), while other studies find limited
or insignificant impact (Morrow, Siverson and Tabares, 1998; Barbieri and Levy, 1999).
Some authors attempt to explain the mixed results observed in the literature. For instance, Li and Sacko
(2002:13–19) posit that the impact of military conflict on trade depends on the predictability of the conflict
on the part of the firms. War can be considered as a product of a stochastic process, in which case the
governments do not have full expectation ex ante that a military conflict will occur. Traders do not have
more complete information than their respective governments, and as such do not also fully expect the
occurrence of such armed confrontation. The negative impact of a military conflict on bilateral trade will
be greater: (i) if it is less expected that the conflict will exist, (ii) if all parties do not expect beforehand
that it will be severe, and (iii) if the conflict endures longer than expected. Empirical analysis conducted
by the authors yield results that cohere with their conjectures, with the unexpectedness of the onset of a
military conflict between states and of its severity and duration all having negative impact on bilateral
trade (Li and Sacko, 2002: 27–33).6
Furthermore, as noted by Glick and Taylor (2005:103), some of the empirical studies use samples that
include relatively short time series and limited set of countries (such as only the contiguous or politically
relevant ones), which suggest a higher likelihood of presence of selection bias. In this case, Glick and
Taylor (2005) make use of a large dataset of bilateral trade covering 172 countries over the period 1870 to
1997 and extend the analysis on two fronts: (i) inclusion of lagged terms to determine if a military conflict7
has effects on trade beyond its contemporaneous impact, and (ii) examination of the possible presence
of spill-over effects associated with a military conflict. Their results show that war has a significant
negative impact on trade between belligerent countries, with the said effect lingering for a couple of
years. War also has an adverse effect on trade between belligerent and neutral countries, with more
remarkable figures observed when the analysis is limited to the major wars (see Table 4) (Glick and Taylor,
2005:109).
Other studies examine the impact of a military dispute on inflow of foreign direct investments. The
emergence of such type of conflict can increase the risk associated with operating on countries that
are party to the dispute, in turn increasing the uncertainty on the returns that firms can earn from their
investments (Jensen, 2006; Jensen and Young 2008; Bussman, 2010). The presence of risk may induce
multinational firms to resort to measures that aim to ensure that their operations will remain smooth
(such as increasing the security of their affiliate offices), which will then increase the cost associated with
operating in those countries (Spich and Grosse, 2005).
It is also possible that host country governments modify their regulatory policies toward foreign
investments as a result of a military conflict. Governments can utilize an array of tools which include
imposition of capital controls to discourage their multinational enterprises to invest on their adversaries.
Also, such governments can induce affiliates of multinational firms from hostile countries to repatriate
less amount of profit to their respective countries of origin and even expropriate the firms’ assets as a
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result of the military conflict (Li and Vaschilko, 2010:767–768). Both of these are expected to reduce the
amount of bilateral investments among countries that are party to a military dispute.
Li (2006:245–251) finds that the emergence of an unanticipated military dispute among states is
associated with a lower probability that a country will be chosen as location for potential investment.
Relatedly, using data on 1117 dyads or country pairs from 1980 to 2000, Li and Vaschilko (2010:773–776)
find that military conflict affects bilateral foreign direct investments only for dyads in which one country
is a high income country and the other a low income country. On the other hand, military conflicts are
found to have insignificant effect on bilateral investments between high income countries.
The authors posit that a possible explanation behind the observed result concerns the existence of
relatively few military disputes among high income country pairs in the sample. Many high income
countries have democratic governments and disputes are usually settled through mediation. Another
possible explanation put forward by the authors concerns the difference with regards to the dominant type
of bilateral investments for the two types of country pairs in the sample. In particular, bilateral investments
for high income-low income country pairs tend to be more vertical, in which case, the investment made
is a vital component of a production chain that serves a large market while bilateral investments for high
income countries tend to be more horizontal. It is possible for a military dispute to have more significant
impact on vertical-type investments given that various countries (in particular, all countries that are part
of the production chain) are affected in this case as opposed to horizontal-type investments in which the
disruption is limited only to countries that are part of the dispute (Li and Vaschilko, 2010:775).

4.4 Health Outcomes
Studies have also shown that military conflict can adversely affect development outcomes. For instance,
Akresh et al. (2012:335–337) find that Eritrean children who were born during the Ethiopian-Eritrean
conflict from 1998 to 2000 and were living in a conflict region have 0.42 standard deviation lower
height-for-age Z scores. This in turn makes their average height-for-age Z score 22% lower than that of
children who were born in a nonconflict region during the war. This has implications on the future health,
education, and labor market outcomes of the affected children, with the affected children estimated to
have 4.3% less wage in their adulthood.8

5. The Economic Implications of War: The Case of West Philippine Sea/South China Sea
Existing empirical research on the economic disruptions and costs of conflict can be used to estimate the
economic implications of a potential armed conflict in the West Philippine Sea /South China Sea, where
various countries have overlapping and competing territorial and jurisdictional claims. While there are
myriad possible economic implications, our focus here is on the disrupted economic activity due to a
conflict, possibly triggering contraction in international trade. In order to illustrate, this section examines
the potential economic implications of an armed conflict, in particular among the following country pairs:
(i) Indonesia and China, (ii) China and the Philippines, and (iii) China and Vietnam.
As a first step, we build on work by Glick and Taylor (2005) who undertake one of the most
comprehensive empirical analyses of conflict. The results of their analysis show that a military conflict
between two countries is typically associated with a significant reduction in bilateral trade, estimated to
be 85% of their average trade flow in 1985 US$, during the onset of the conflict. Furthermore, conflict has
lingering effect on bilateral trade between two belligerents, with the adverse effect on trade very slowly
tapering off only after a decade (see Table 5). As can also be seen in Table 5, the same study finds that a
military conflict has an adverse and also lingering effect on trade between belligerent and neutral countries
The results above can be applied to the aforementioned cases. Drawing on the work of Rose and
Spiegel (2004), the bilateral trade data used are deflated using USA CPI to provide a close estimate of
such trade values in 1985 dollars.10 The export and import flows (in 1985 US$) are then averaged to arrive
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Table 3. Selected Studies on the Impact of Military Conflict on GDP Growth and GDP per Capita.

Authors

Observations

Empirical method

Yamarik et al.
(2010)

158 countries over
the period 1960
to 2000

Deep determinants
regression approach

Polachek and
Sevastianova
(2010)

81 countries over
the period 1970
to 2000

Fixed effects regression

Koubi (2005)

114 countries over
the periods 1960
to 1974 (for
war/conflict
observations)
and 1975 to 1989
(for observations
on economic
growth)

OLS regression (with
conflict indicator that is
not contemporaneous
with economic growth)

Results

r A standard deviation increase in
fatality-weighted conflict indicator
results to a decrease in 2000 real
GDP per capita by around 14% of
a standard deviation.
r High-intensity interstate military
conflict reduces annual growth by
0.18 to 2.77 percentage points.
r High-intensity interstate military
conflict results to lower annual
economic growth across all
countries using observations with
1-year and 2-year time intervals
r High-intensity interstate military
conflict results to lower annual
economic growth using
observations from low-income
and African countries
r Doubling the duration of war from
its mean value increases per
annum economic growth by 22%

Source: Synthesis of studies compiled by the authors.

at an indicator of bilateral trade flow that is consistent with the one used in Glick and Taylor (2005). The
estimated percentages in Table 5 are then applied to determine the foregone bilateral trade between two
countries assuming a conflict occurs between them in 2005. Foregone bilateral trade is estimated using
data from 2005 to 2015 to take into account the possible lagged effects of such conflict.
The cumulative implication of a 1-year military conflict can be considered as significant, ranging from
around US$ 27.3 billion (for China-Vietnam case) to US$ 39.9 billion (for Indonesia-China case), all
of which are expressed in 1985 US$ (see Table 6). A comparison of the said figures with the estimated
GDP (in 1985 dollars) of the countries included in the analysis in 2005 provides a clearer picture of the
potential extent of the implications of such type of conflict.
While the estimated cumulative foregone average trade flow is equivalent to a much larger proportion
of Philippines’ and Vietnam’s respective GDPs, the estimated figures can also be considered as significant
in China’s and Indonesia’s respective cases. China’s defense spending in 2005 is equivalent to around
US$ 39.1 billion (in 1985 US$),11 which is marginally larger than the estimated cumulative foregone
average trade flow between China and Indonesia. However, assuming that military conflicts among the
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Table 4. Selected Studies on the Impact of Military Conflict on International Trade.
Authors

Observations

Empirical method

Pollins
(1989)

25 countries over the
period 1960 to 1975

OLS regression applied to
cross section of
countries for each year
OLS regression (but use of
panel corrected standard
errors in place of usual
standard errors)

Morrow et al. Seven countries
(1998)
(considered major
powers) over the
period 1907 to 1913,
1920 to 1938, 1948
to 1990)
Barbieri and Seven dyads
Levy
(Argentina–UK,
(1999)
UK–China,
UK–Egypt,
Cyprus–Turkey,
Greece–Turkey,
Uganda–Tanzania,
USA–China) over the
period 1870 to 1992
Anderton and 14 major power dyads
Carter
and 13 nonmajor
(2001)
power dyads
Li and Sacko One dataset consisting
(2002)
of 56 countries from
1870 to 1992
Postwar dataset
consisting of 120
countries from 1950
to 1992
Glick and
50 countries over the
Taylor
period 1870 to 1938
(2005)
and 171 countries
over the period 1938
to 1997

Interrupted time series
analysis

Interrupted time series
analysis
Fixed effects regression

Country-pair fixed effects
regression

Source: Synthesis of various studies compiled by the authors.
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Results

r Lagged conflict indicator is
(statistically) significantly related to
trade variable on all regression runs
r Militarized interstate dispute does not
have a statistically significant effect on
trade

r Statistically significant and negative
effect of war on trade on only one dyad
(Argentina–UK)
r No adverse permanent effect
associated with war on trade for all
dyads included

r Greater number of dyads for which
war has a negative and significant
effect on trade
r Onset of an unexpected militarized
interstate dispute and the degree of
unpredictability of such dispute reduce
bilateral trade ex post

r 85% decline in average trade flow
between belligerent countries at the
onset of a military conflict
r Decline in annual average trade flow
between belligerent countries of about
3% to 73% in the decade after the
onset of a conflict (with larger decline
observed in the years immediately
preceding the onset of a military
conflict)
r Decline in annual average trade flow
between belligerent and neutral
country of about 5% to 12% as a result
of a military conflict and about 42% to
65% as a result of major wars
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Table 5. Estimated Average Effect of a Military Conflict on Trade (from Glick and Taylor, 2005).

Years after the war
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Reduction in trade
between adversaries

Reduction in trade between a
belligerent and a neutral9

85%
73%
74%
68%
52%
43%
32%
21%
21%
10%
3%

12%
7%
4%
5%
9%
7%
9%
5%
Insignificant
Insignificant
Insignificant

Source: Glick and Taylor (2005: 111).

Table 6. Foregone Bilateral Trade and 2005 GDP (Expressed in 1985 prices) Based on Glick and Taylor’s
(2005) Estimates (in Billions).

Cases
China and Indonesia
China and Philippines
China and Vietnam

GDP China
GDP Partner
(1985 dollars) (1985 dollars)
1939.180

234.7
64.3
51.6

Total Foregone Average Trade

Cumulative
foregone
average trade
(1985 dollars)

Foregone trade
(% of China’s
GDP)

Foregone trade
(% of partner
country’s GDP)

39.1
32.5
27.3

2.02%
1.67%
1.41%

16.65%
50.51%
52.85%

98.8

Note: A country’s GDP for a particular year can be expressed in 1985 dollars by applying the relevant real
GDP growth rate figures of the said country (from the World Development Indicators) to the country’s GDP
(expressed in current dollars) in 1985. For a justification of the said methodology, please refer to the following
link: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/faq.htm#q3c.
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from UN Comtrade Database.

three country pairs considered all occurred in 2005, the total foregone trade from these conflicts is around
US$ 98.8 billion (in 1985 US$) which is more than 2.5 times as large as China’s defense spending (also
in 1985 US$).
In the case of Indonesia, the cumulative foregone average trade in a hypothetical conflict with China
is equivalent to more than 16% of the country’s GDP in 2005 (expressed in 1985 US$), which is larger
than the estimated contribution of agriculture sector on Indonesia’s total GDP in 2005 (at 13.1% of
GDP12 ). Furthermore, the estimates do not include the value of foregone bilateral trade between each of
the countries considered (China, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam) and other countries that are neutral
to the hypothetical military conflicts (see Appendix A for more details on the estimated foregone average
trade flow for each country pair considered).
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Table 7(a). Foregone Trade in 2006 Based on Li and Sacko’s (2002) Estimates (Postwar Sample, in Billions).

Cases

Estimated foregone Foregone total trade Foregone average
Total bilateral trade in trade in current US$
in 1985 US$
trade in 1985 US$
2006 (current US$)
(postwar sample)
(postwar sample) (postwar sample)

China and Indonesia
China and Philippines
China and Vietnam

19.1
23.4
9.9

2.3
2.8
1.2

1.2
1.5
0.6

Total foregone average trade

0.6
0.8
0.3
1.7

Source: Authors’ calculations using data from UN Comtrade Database.

Table 7(b). Foregone Trade in 2006 Based on Li and Sacko’s (2002) Estimates (Larger Sample, in Billions).

Cases

Estimated foregone Foregone total trade Foregone average
Total bilateral trade in trade in current US$ in 1985 US$ (larger trade in 1985 US$
2006 (current US$)
(larger sample)
sample)
(larger sample)

China and Indonesia
China and Philippines
China and Vietnam

19.1
23.4
9.9

1.2
1.5
0.6

Total foregone average trade

0.7
0.8
0.3

0.3
0.4
0.2
1

Source: Authors’ calculations using data from UN Comtrade Database.

Li and Sacko (2002), on the other hand, estimate that the onset of unexpected military conflict between
two countries is associated with a 12% reduction in trade using a post-World War sample of 20 countries
from 1949 to 1992, and a 6.5% reduction in trade using a larger sample of 56 countries from 1870 to
1992. For each country pair, the authors used the total value of trade between the two countries (in current
US$) as their trade indicator, and that their indicator for the onset of unexpected military conflict is lagged
by 1 year. Assuming that hypothetical military conflict occurs for each country pair considered in 2005,
the findings by Li and Sacko (2002) can be used to come up with an alternative estimate of the value of
foregone trade in 2006.
As Tables 7(a) and 7(b) show, the estimated foregone average trade (in 1985 dollars) due to onset of
an unexpected military conflict ranges from US$ 318.6 million (China and Vietnam case) to US$ 749.8
million (China and Philippines case) using the postwar sample estimate, and from US$ 172.6 million
(China and Vietnam) to US$ 406.1 million (China and Philippines) using the larger sample estimate.13
These correspond to total estimated foregone average trade (in 1985 dollars) of around US$ 1.7 billion
(using the postwar sample) and US$ 909.3 million (using the larger sample) among the country pairs
considered, both of which are smaller than the total foregone average trade estimated based on results in
Glick and Taylor (2005).
On the other hand, Brutger and Wright (2014) examine the implications of a territorial dispute, along
with the potential armed conflict that can arise, on bilateral trade. They find that a territorial dispute between
two countries is associated with a 55% decline in the value of their total bilateral trade (expressed in 2000
US$) in a given year, and that if the territorial dispute is accompanied by a military dispute, the marginal
effect increases to 82%.
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Table 8(a). Foregone Trade in 2005 Due to a Territorial Dispute Based on Brutger and Wright’s (2014)
Estimates (in Billions).

Cases

Estimated foregone Estimated foregone Estimated average
trade due to a
trade due to a
foregone trade due
Total Bilateral Trade territorial dispute
territorial dispute
to a territorial
2005 (2000 US$)
(2000 US$)
(1985 US$)
dispute (1985 US$)

China and Indonesia
China and Philippines
China and Vietnam

14.8
15.5
7.2

8.1
8.5
4

5.1
5.3
2.5

Total foregone average trade

2.5
2.7
1.2
6.4

Source: Authors’ calculations using data from UN Comtrade Database.

Table 8(b). Foregone Trade in 2005 Due to Territorial and Maritime Disputes Based on Brutger and Wright’s
(2014) Estimates.

Cases

Total bilateral trade
2005 (2000 US$)

China and Indonesia
China and Philippines
China and Vietnam

Estimated foregone Estimated foregone Estimated average
trade due to
trade due to
foregone trade due
territorial and
territorial and
to territorial and
military disputes
military disputes
military disputes
(2000 US$)
(1985 US$)
(1985 US$)

14.8
15.5
7.2

12.1
12.7
5.9

Total foregone average trade

7.6
7.9
3.7

3.8
4
1.9
9.6

Source: Authors’ calculations using data from UN Comtrade Database.

Tables 8(a) and 8(b) show an alternative estimate of the implications of hypothetical conflict for each
of the three country pairs, based on findings by Brutger and Wright (2014). The estimated average trade
implications are larger relative to the corresponding figures in Tables 7(a) and 7(b) (based on Li and
Sacko’s [2002] analysis). These include the estimated foregone average trade flow (in 1985 dollars) due
to presence of a territorial dispute only, which ranges from US$ 1.2 billion in the case of China and
Vietnam to US$ 2.7 billion in the case of China and the Philippines.

6. Conclusion
The economic effects associated with territorial and maritime disputes among states are myriad and vary
greatly in their size and extent. Much of the existing literature in this area finds evidence suggesting
implications on both growth and development outcomes. These implications can be traced to the nature
of confrontations among the disputing states. Nonviolent confrontations entail policy uncertainty, trade
volume contraction, and barriers to natural resources. Violent, military confrontations entail the casualties,
foregone trade and investment, and decreased standards of living.
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While the literature is not unanimous with regards to the presence of possible adverse effect of armed
conflict on some economic outcomes (e.g., Koubi, 2005; Miguel and Roland, 2011), this does not mean
that war can be a socially desirable option. As noted by Miguel and Roland (2011:3–4), one cannot
discount the humanitarian costs and the short-run but disruptive effects of a military conflict on the
economy.
Based on the review of evidence herein, the economic implications of conflict in terms of foregone
average trade among the country pairs considered in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea (in 1985
dollars) – which differ in important ways but hint at some common channels of impact – could range
from US$ 909.3 million to US$ 98.8 billion. More broadly, the impacts on a disrupted global production
chain can easily amplify these results even further, affecting global growth prospects for many decades,
according to experience. Unfortunately, it is not yet possible to affix probabilities to these estimates.
But the goal here nevertheless is to try to illustrate the possible range of economic disruption that could
take place. Clearly, economic disruption in this part of the world could result in dramatic economic
and human development implications for the countries concerned – and perhaps even the rest of the
world.
Further studies could explore what factors, such as the initial wealth of the countries involved, the
intensity and protractedness of the conflict, and how the risks of conflict re-emergence is managed,
affect economic implications of disputes. Furthermore, the authors found that maritime disputes and its
economic implications remain unexplored in literature relative to disputes over territorial sovereignty.
Efforts towards illuminating the economic aspects of maritime disputes would be increasingly relevant
as the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea disputes develop on the world stage.

Notes
1. The study included only country pairs that are adjacent to each other or separated by no more than
400 miles of water.
2. The authors do not find a strongly significant effect of presence of territorial dispute on trade with
other parties.
3. One estimate shows that around 20% of fishermen are small-scale fishermen who earn less than US$ 1
a day, and that many of them can be found in Asia (FAO, 2002). In the case of the Philippines,
poverty incidence among fishermen is estimated to be around 39.2% in 2012 (PSA-NSCB,
2012).
4. The conflict indicator is formulated by first computing the weighted sum of all bilateral conflicts in
which a particular country is involved during a particular year, with the average daily fatality figure
of each conflict serving as its weight. The yearly indicators from 1960 to 2000 are then summed up
to generate the conflict indicator used in their study.
5. For 2-year time intervals, one observation corresponds to 1971 to 1972, 1973 to 1974, and so forth.
The average value of most indicators for years included in a unit of observation serves as the value
of such indicators for that unit of observation.
6. In this case, the authors simulate the firms’ calculation of the possibility of a military conflict by
modelling the onset of a conflict as a function of various variables which include bilateral trade flows
and trade interdependence, historical commonality, distance, presence of alliance and the presence
of a major world power in a country pair or dyad, among others.
7. This includes declarations of war and conflicts associated with more than 1000 battle deaths.
8. The estimate is based on the following figures: Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2006) find that
a one standard deviation decrease in height is associated with 0.678 fewer grades completed in
Zimbabwe while Krishnan, Selassie and Dercon (1998) estimate the returns to education in Ethiopia
to be around 15%.
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9. A belligerent for a particular year is a country that is involved in a war (as defined by Glick and
Taylor) for that year while a neutral is a country that is not involved in a war during that year.
10. In this case, Rtradet=NtradetCPItCPI1985, where Rtradet is the value of trade flow in 1985 prices,
Ntradet is the value of trade flow in current prices, CPIt is the US CPI for year t, and CPI1985 is the
US CPI for the year 1985. The World Development Indicators serve as the source of data on US CPI
(with 2000 = 100).
11. It is estimated that defense spending accounts for approximately 2.02% of China’s GDP in 2005,
and the said figure was applied to the estimated GDP in 1985 dollars in 2005 (source of data: World
Development Indicators).
12. Figure is from World Development Indicators.
13. Dividing total foregone bilateral trade figures (in 1985 dollars) by 2 yields the corresponding values
for the average foregone bilateral trade (in 1985 dollars).
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Appendix A: Estimated foregone average bilateral trade, 2005 to 2015 (based on estimated
average effects by Glick and Taylor (2005)
The tables below show the estimated foregone average trade flow due to hypothetical military conflict
among the country pairs considered. The 1985 trade figures are derived by deflating the values of trade
flows from 2005 to 2015 using USA CPI figures. The foregone average trade figures are based on the
average effects estimated by Glick and Taylor (2005) of a military conflict on trade between belligerent
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countries. In this case, 2005 is year 0 (which means that the hypothetical conflict occurred in 2005), while
2006 is year 1, and so on.

Table A1. Bilateral Trade (Current and Constant) and Foregone Trade from a Hypothetical Military Conflict:
China and Indonesia (in Billions).

Year

Imports by China from
Indonesia (1985 dollars)

Exports to Indonesia
by China (1985
dollars)

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

4.6
5.1
6.5
7.1
6.9
10.3
15
15
14.5
11.1
9

4.6
5.0
6.6
8.6
7.4
10.8
14
16.1
17.1
17.8
15.6

Total from 2005–2015 (1985 dollars)

Average trade Foregone average
(1985 dollars) trade (1985 dollars)
4.6
5.1
6.5
7.9
7.1
10.5
14.5
15.5
15.8
14.4
12.3

3.9
3.7
4.8
5.4
3.7
4.5
4.6
3.3
3.3
1.4
0.4

114.3

39.1

Source: Authors’ calculations using data from UN Comtrade Database.

Table A2. Bilateral Trade (Current and Constant) and Foregone Trade from a Hypothetical Military Conflict:
Philippines and China (in Billions).

Year

Imports by China
from the Philippines
(1985 dollars)

Exports to Philippines
by China (1985 dollars)

Average trade
(1985 dollars)

Foregone average
trade (1985
dollars)

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

7.1
9.4
12
9.7
6
8
8.6
9.2
8.4
9.5
8.6

2.6
3.1
3.9
4.6
4.3
5.7
6.8
7.8
9.2
10.7
12.1

4.8
6.2
8
7.2
5.1
6.8
7.7
8.5
8.8
10.1
10.4

4.1
4.6
5.9
4.9
2.7
2.9
2.5
1.8
1.8
1
0.3

83.7

32.5

Total from 2005 to 2015 (1985 dollars)
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from UN Comtrade Database.
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Table A3. Bilateral Trade (Current and Constant) and Foregone Trade from a Hypothetical Military Conflict:
China and Vietnam (in Billions).

Year

Imports by China
from Vietnam (1985
dollars)

Exports to Vietnam by
China (1985 dollars)

Average trade
(1985 dollars)

Foregone average
trade (1985
dollars)

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

1.4
1.3
1.7
2.2
2.4
3.4
5.3
7.6
7.8
9
11.4

3.1
4
6.2
7.6
8.2
11.4
13.9
16.0
22.4
29
30.1

2.3
2.7
3.9
4.9
5.3
7.4
9.6
11.8
15.1
19
20.8

1.9
1.9
2.9
3.3
2.7
3.2
3.1
2.5
3.2
1.9
0.6

102.7

27.3

Total from 2005–2015 (1985 dollars)
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from UN Comtrade Database.
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